International Negotiation
A Journal of Theory and Practice
| This issue | Guest editors |
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Negotiating with Terrorists |
I. William Zartman, The Johns Hopkins University | ||
Abstracts Vol. 8, no. 3 2003
Negotiating with Terrorists |
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| I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), The Johns Hopkins University, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington DC 20036 USA (E-mail: izartma1@jhu.edu) |
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| Negotiating with terrorists is possible,
within limits, as the articles in this issue show and explore.
Limits come initially in the distinction between absolute and contingent
terrorists, and then between revolutionary and conditional absolutes
and between barricaders, kidnappers and hijackers in the contingent
category. Revolutionary absolute are nonnegotiable adversaries,
but even conditional absolutes are potentially negotiable and contingent
terrorists actually seek negotiation. The official negotiator is
faced with the task of giving a little in order to get the terrorist
to give a lot, a particularly difficult imbalance to obtain given
the highly committed and desperate nature of terrorists as they
follow rational but highly unconventional tactics. Such are the
challenges of negotiating with terrorists that this issue of the
journal explores and elucidates. Key words: negotiation; terrorism; terms of trade; hostages; suicide. |
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| Negotiating the Non-Negotiable: Dealing with Absolutist Terrorists | |
RICHARD E. HAYES, STACEY R. KAMINSKI and STEVEN M. BERES |
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| Terrorism has taken on a new form in which
loss of life is par for the course and where terrorist demands
are often impossible to meet. To combat these new absolutist terrorists,
the US government has developed innovative approaches to defend
national security, including negotiating with state sponsors of
terrorism with the threat of force for noncompliance, isolating
the violent actors by offering financial rewards for assistance
in combating terror, and offering and employing international intelligence
assistance. Each of these approaches, whether it results in a reward
or punishment, involves some form of negotiation with the terrorists
or those who support them to gain the information necessary to
disrupt terrorist networks and convict those responsible. Key words: terrorism, Al Qaeda, government, negotiation, security, Taliban |
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| Negotiating with Terrorists: The Hostage Case | |
| GUY OLIVIER FAURE Université de Paris V – Sorbonne, Paris , France (Email: go.faure@free.fr) |
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| This article provides an overview of hostage
negotiations, drawing upon historical cases and analyzing them
from the perspective of negotiation theory. Various situational
factors are studied, including the parties involved, hostage taker
motivations and profiles, negotiator objectives and what is considered
to be negotiable, the issue of legitimacy, and the negotiation
context. The article also analyzes the dynamics of the negotiation
process, addressing the different phases, hostage attitudes, information
gathering, and the role of the media and public opinion. The intercultural
and psychological dimensions of hostage negotiation are also addressed.
The final section of the article considers end-game scenarios,
and assessing the negotiation outcome of such complex and uncertain
processes. Key words: Negotiation, terrorists, hostages, kidnapping, power, ideology, political militants, legitimacy, culture, uncertainty, high stakes, hostage-barricade incidents, fishbowl theory, psychotic behavior, Stockholm syndrome, cognition, values, ethics, “chicken” paradigm. |
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Contrasting Dynamics of Crisis Negotiations: Barricade versus Kidnapping Incidents |
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| ADAM DOLNIK WMD Terrorism Project, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 460 Pierce Street, Monterey, CA, 93940 USA (E-mail: adam.dolnik@miis.edu) |
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| Over the past several decades, crisis negotiation
has become the primary method of dealing with hostage incidents
in many countries of the world. This article uses the analytical
framework of interest-based negotiation to provide a comparative
analysis of the negotiation dynamics involved in barricade versus
kidnapping incidents. The primary difference between the two scenarios
is that the location of the victim(s) as well as that of the perpetrator(s)
is unknown in kidnappings. As a result, many of the components
of crisis negotiation that have been so successful in resolving
barricade situations are inapplicable to kidnappings. This article
should help the reader understand the critical differences between
the two scenarios, and the implications of those differences for
the likelihood of success of different crisis negotiation strategies.
Central focus is devoted to premeditated incidents perpetrated
by organized groups with a political, criminal, or religious motivation. Key words: negotiation, hostage, terrorist, kidnapping, crisis, barricade, criminal. |
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Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations |
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| WILLIAM A. DONOHUE Department of Communication, Michigan State University , East Lansing , MI 48824-1212 USA (E-mail: donohue@msu.edu) and PAUL J. TAYLOR Department of Psychology, University of Liverpool , Liverpool L69 3BX , United Kingdom |
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| This article examines the effects of role
on terrorists' use of power and affiliative strategies in negotiation
as a function of terrorist ideology, incident type, and the outcome
that is achieved. Data were scores on eight behavioral scales designed
to reflect the dynamics of 186 terrorist negotiations, as reported
in detailed chronological accounts. Results supported the hypothesized
one-down effect with terrorists' use of power-oriented strategies
complemented by authority's use of affiliation-oriented strategies.
The extent to which terrorists used aggressive strategies was related
to the resolution of the incident, with attenuated outcomes more
likely for those using more aggressive strategies. These dynamics
differed across incident type, with aerial hijackings involving
more overt power strategies than barricade-siege incidents, which
were more likely to involve bargaining for certain outcomes. Finally,
terrorist ideology and the associated identity concerns magnified
the one-down effect, with religious fundamentalists engaging in
more violence and less compromising strategies than terrorists
with other ideological backgrounds. Key words: role, one-down effect, power, affiliation, complementarity, terrorism, ideology. |
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| Negotiating under the Cross: The Story of the Forty Day Siege of the Church of Nativity | |
| MOTY CRISTAL (E-mail: M.Cristal@lse.ac.uk) |
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| This article provides an insider's observation
of negotiations with terrorists, in particular, the negotiation
process carried out by Israel and armed Palestinians who were barricaded
in the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem . By applying various negotiation
methodologies, the author describes the challenges, strategies
and methods used by the military Crisis Negotiation Unit to manage
and resolve this international crisis, and draws general lessons
for future negotiation situations developed within the modern counter-terrorism
arena. Key words: negotiations, terrorists, Israel/Palestine conflict, conflict resolution, crisis management, hostage situation |
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| The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: The Perpetrators, their Tactics, and the Russian Response | |
| ADAM DOLNIK and RICHARD PILCH Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 460 Pierce Street , Monterey , CA , 93940 USA (E-mail: adam.dolnik@miis.edu; richard.pilch@miis.edu) |
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| The Moscow theater hostage crisis was a
spectacular media event, which sparked a wide domestic and international
debate concerning the appropriateness of the Russian response.
This article attempts to reconstruct and assess the events that
took place in terms of negotiability of the incident, and seeks
to provide an analytical perspective on the possible alternatives
that were available to the Russian authorities throughout the crisis.
Part I provides a brief overview of the events that unfolded. This
section of the article also places Chechen motivations behind the
incident into perspective with regard to past Chechen operations
and to their overall strategy. Part II focuses on the details of
the attack itself, particularly the Russian response. Special attention
is devoted to analyzing the successes and failures of both the
negotiations and the tactical assault. The conclusion discusses
the implications of the Moscow theater incident for the future,
including its potential impact on the likelihood of success of
crisis negotiation strategies and the future tactics of the Chechen
rebels. Key words: negotiation, hostage, terrorist, Chechnya , crisis, Moscow , theater, gas |
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| Negotiating with Villains Revisited: Research Note | |
| BERTRAM I. SPECTOR Center for Negotiation Analysis, 11608 Le Havre Drive , Potomac , MD 20854 USA (E-mail: negocenter@msn.com) |
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| An earlier article examined the conditions
under which it is reasonable to negotiate with rogue states. This
article extends the argument to non-state terrorist “villains.” Despite
the risks inherent in negotiating with terrorists, the risks of
following a no-negotiation policy are likely to be more deadly.
States need to assess terrorist interests and intentions to find
if there are reasonable entry points for negotiation and take advantage
of these to transform the conflict. Key words: negotiating with terrorists; rogue states; appeasement |
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